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CASE NOTE 
THE FUTURE OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS AFTER THE 
DECISION OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT IN NOEL CANNING V. NLRB  
JAMES M. HOBBS† 
INTRODUCTION  
President Obama outraged congressional Republicans in early 2012 
when he used his recess appointment power to name the first Director of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and three new mem-
bers to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).1 The President made 
the appointments despite pro forma Senate sessions specifically designed to 
prevent him from filling the positions.2 Partisans from both sides of the 
aisle immediately jumped in. Were these intrasession recess appointments 
an example of the President “arrogantly circumvent[ing] the American 
people . . . . [in] a sharp departure from a longstanding precedent”?3 Or 
were the pro forma sessions nothing more than a “gimmick” created to 
 
† Alumni & Philanthropy Chair, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D. 
Candidate, 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, Colorado College. I would 
like to thank the editors of the Law Review for their work on this piece, particularly Jessica Rice 
and Bianca Nunes. All remaining errors are my own.  
1 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Announces Recess Appoint-
ments to Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Recess Appointment Press Release], 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/����/�1/04/president-obama-announces-
recess-appointments-key-administration-posts. Senator Mitch McConnell called the move 
“unprecedented” and argued that it placed the appointees “in uncertain legal territory.” Laura 
Meckler, Obama Appoints Cordray to Lead Consumer Bureau, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2012), http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203471004577140552133809784.html.  
2 See Meckler, supra note 1. 
3 Id. (quoting Senator McConnell). 
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threaten “the President’s constitutional authority to make appointments to 
keep the government running”?4 
Barely a year later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals waded into the 
debate when it decided Noel Canning v. NLRB.5 In a “bombshell”6 ruling 
that has been described as “surprisingly broad,”7 the panel unanimously 
declared the President’s appointments to the NLRB unconstitutional.8 Of 
the three other federal appellate courts to consider the scope of the recess 
appointment power, all have reached conclusions wholly opposite to that of 
Noel Canning.9 The reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s decision would have 
invalidated the majority of recess appointments made by U.S. presidents 
from Ronald Reagan forward.10 
President Obama’s recess appointments were politically controversial, 
but all then-existing case law suggested they were constitutional. Still, the 
Supreme Court had never clarified the precise parameters of the Recess 
Appointments Clause.11 Private litigants relied on that gray area to chal-
lenge the official acts of recess appointees. This case began as a run-of-the-
mill labor dispute, but took on greater significance when Noel Canning chal-
lenged the recess appointments and the NLRB’s authority. On appeal before 
the D.C. Circuit, the validity of the appointments became the central issue.  
Acknowledging its departure from the reasoning of its sister circuits, a 
panel of the D.C. Circuit unanimously declared the President’s appointments 
unconstitutional because it interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause as 
 
4 Dan Pfeiffer, America’s Consumer Watchdog, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012, 10:45 
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/04/americas-consumer-watchdog. 
5 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
6 Carrie Johnson, Court Ruling Upsets Conventional Wisdom on Recess Appointments, NPR (Jan. 
25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/25/170293179/court-ruling-upsets-conventional 
-wisdom-on-recess-appointments. 
7 Aruna Viswanatha & Terry Baynes, U.S. Court Rules Obama’s Appointments Unconstitutional, 
REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/usa-obama-appointments-
idUSL1N0AU68520130125. 
8 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506-07. 
9 Id. at 509 (acknowledging contrary holdings in the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
10 Of the 652 recess appointments made since January 20, 1981, roughly 329 would be invali-
dated for having occurred during intrasession recesses. Congressional Distribution Memorandum 
from Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., on the Noel Canning Decision and Recess 
Appointments Made from 1981-2013, at 4 tbl.1 (Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Hogue Memo], available at 
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/documents/�
12/pdf/Recess%20Appointments%201981-2013.pdf. The Congressional Research Service estimates 
that “many” of the intersession recess appointments would also be void because they filled 
vacancies that arose prior to the recess during which the appointments were made. See id. at 3. 
11 See infra text accompanying note 17. 
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permitting appointments only during intersession—not intrasession—recesses.12 
Two judges went further, and invalidated the appointments under the 
alternative theory that the President can only use the recess appointment 
power to fill positions that become vacant during the recess in which the 
appointments are made.13 The decision appeared to hamstring the NLRB 
and the newly formed CFPB.   
The logic of Noel Canning, which draws heavily on a formalistic reading 
of the original meaning and purpose of the power, significantly narrows the 
scope of the Recess Appointments Clause in a manner that could “virtually 
eliminate the recess appointment power for all future presidents at a time 
when it has become increasingly difficult to win Senate confirmation for 
nominees.”14 Previous courts placed greater value on the functional, gov-
ernment-enabling benefits of an expansive reading of the clause. Both 
interpretations are reasonable, but they also reflect the differing value 
judgments of the deciding courts.  
Noel Canning created a clear circuit split on a critical constitutional issue, 
and the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari.15 Now the Court must 
balance the same values and make its own determination as to the future of 
recess appointments. The outcome of Noel Canning is incredibly difficult to 
predict. The Court could resolve the case in a number of different ways, and 
the various fundamental issues at stake cannot be divided easily along 
ideological lines. 
Part I of this Note explores how courts have interpreted the Recess 
Appointments Clause in the past. Part II recounts the underlying facts of 
Noel Canning and outlines the arguments of the D.C. Circuit’s majority and 
concurring opinions. Part III considers the implications of the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s ruling for the NLRB and CFPB, and discusses the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in this case.  
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS  
CLAUSE BEFORE NOEL CANNING 
The Constitution provides two methods by which the President may 
appoint officers of the United States. Under the first, “he shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
 
12 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 505-07. 
13 Id. at 514; see also id. at ��� (Griffith, J., concurring). 
14 Charlie Savage & Steven Greenhouse, Court Rejects Obama Move to Fill Posts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/business/court-rejects-recess-appointments-
to-labor-board.html. 
15 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
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Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for.”16 The second method, known as the 
Recess Appointments Clause, follows the first and provides, “[t]he President 
shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess 
of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of 
their next Session.”17 
These provisions appear straightforward on their face, but they are sur-
prisingly open-textured. 18  One scholar aptly observed that the Recess 
Appointments Clause hits a sort of constitutional sweet spot: “There are 
stakes, but they are not too high; there is substantial text to work with, but 
no shortage of interpretive issues.”19  
Three questions shape the interpretive debate. First, what does the term 
“Recess” mean? Specifically, does it include only breaks between sessions 
(intersession recesses) or are breaks within a given session (intrasession 
recesses) encompassed as well? Second, does the phrase “Vacancies that may 
happen” mean that the President can fill positions that happen to be vacant 
during the recess or only vacancies that come into existence during the 
recess? Finally, does the clause permit recess appointments to Article III 
courts? Earlier appellate court opinions consistently favored the broader 
reading of the clause on each of these issues.20 
 
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
18 For the origins of the concept of open texture in the law, see H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW 124-29 (2d ed. 1994). For a useful treatment of the concept, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 984 (1995). Professor Sunstein explains,  
[R]ules have an “open texture,” stemming from two factors: the rule-makers’ igno-
rance of fact and the rule-makers’ indeterminacy of aim. No law is issued with full 
knowledge of the factual situations to which it will be applied, and no law is enacted 
with full understanding of or agreement on its animating purposes.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
19 Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 443 (2005). 
20 See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding the intrases-
sion appointment of a circuit court judge); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 
1985) (en banc) (upholding the intersession appointment of a district court judge to a vacancy that 
existed before the recess began); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); In 
re Farrow, 3 F. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (upholding the recess appointment of a federal appellate 
judge to a vacancy that arose when the Senate was in session). 
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Prior to Noel Canning, only one court had directly considered the validity 
of recess appointments made during intrasession recesses.21  In Evans v. 
Stephens, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the intrasession recess appointment of 
Circuit Judge Pryor, in an opinion built upon respect for the executive 
branch’s longstanding interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause; 
the clause’s plain meaning; historical use of intrasession appointments; and 
the pragmatic, government-facilitating purpose of the provision. 22  The 
court argued that the pragmatic purpose of the clause is simply to allow the 
President to make appointments when the Senate’s advice is unavailable, 
regardless of the type of recess. 23  This interpretation is supported by 
scholars who view the recess power in a similarly pragmatic light,24 or who 
believe political forces are sufficient to check presidential overreach.25 The 
opposing view—that the Constitution only allows for recess appointments 
between official sessions of Congress—had never been expressed in a 
majority opinion, but a vigorous dissent in Evans presaged the reasoning of 
Noel Canning. 26  Some scholars also challenged the Evans decision by 
presenting alternative interpretations of the clause’s purpose, complicating 
the historical record relied on by the Evans majority, and calling for greater 
attention to the original intent of the Framers.27 
 
21 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1221, 1224 (determining the constitutionality of a recess appointment 
made during a two-week break in the Senate’s session). 
22 See id. at 1226 (“[G]iven the words of the Constitution and the history, we are unpersuaded 
by the argument that the recess appointment power may only be used in an intersession recess, 
but not an intrasession recess. Furthermore, what we understand to be the main purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause—to enable the President to fill vacancies to assure the proper 
functioning of our government—supports [our conclusion].”). 
23 See id. This is particularly persuasive in light of the fact that intrasession recesses may 
actually be longer than their intersession counterparts. See id. at n.10 (noting that intersession recesses 
have been as short as zero days, while some intrasession recesses have lasted several months). 
24 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional 
Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377, 427-41 (2005) (adopting a functional perspective on the 
Recess Appointments Clause and arguing for a broad interpretation); Herz, supra note 19, at 456-
�� (exploring the difficulty of interpreting the clause in light of conflicting purposes, but 
ultimately rejecting those arguments based solely on original purpose). 
25 See Patrick Hein, Comment, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The Effectiveness 
of Political Counterweights, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 252-56 (2008) (noting that political checks on 
the President may be the most effective limitation on the recess appointment power). 
26 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1228-38 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
27 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1547-73 (2005) (employing extensive historical research to argue for a 
limited reading of the Recess Appointments Clause that would not permit intrasession appoint-
ments); Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments 
Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2230 (1994) (objecting to intrasession recess appointments as 
inconsistent with original intent). 
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Turning to the second constitutional question, federal appellate courts 
consistently have held that vacancies need not arise during the recess to be 
properly filled by recess appointments.28 Again, these courts have been 
motivated by pragmatic realities—if you want a functioning government, 
why should it matter whether a vacancy begins on the last day of a session 
or the first day of a recess?29 Each court also draws on “written executive 
interpretations from as early as 1823, and legislative acquiescence” in the 
President’s broad exercise of the recess appointment power.30 Commenta-
tors who support an expansive view of the first constitutional question also 
tend to support appointments that fill vacancies that “happen to exist”—as 
opposed to only those that fill vacancies that “happen to arise”—for similar 
practical and structural reasons.31 This view is not universal, however. A 
dissenting opinion on this question criticized the Evans majority’s reliance 
on a single statute to demonstrate congressional acquiescence and argued 
that the majority interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause threat-
ened to swallow the primary method of Senate confirmation.32 Scholars 
have also conducted extensive historical research to make a legitimate case 
that the executive branch’s view of this issue has not been as consistent as 
the majority perspective suggests.33 At least one nineteenth-century court 
held that the President could fill a vacancy only when it arose during the 
recess, 34  further complicating the narrative of the majority view. Still, 
 
28 See, e.g., Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226-27; United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709-15 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Farrow, 3 
F. 112, 115-16 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880).  
29 See, e.g., Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012 (asserting that adopting the “happen to arise” interpreta-
tion “would lead to the absurd result that all offices vacant on the day the Senate recesses would 
have to remain vacant at least until the Senate reconvenes”); Allocco, 305 F.2d at 712 (arguing that 
restricting the President’s recess power to “vacancies which arise while the Senate is away” would 
lead to “Executive paralysis and do violence to the orderly functioning of our complex government”). 
30 Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226 (citing Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012; Allocco, 305 F.2d at 709-15; and 
Farrow, 3 F. 112). 
31 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 24, at 381-407 (providing an extensive argument in favor of a 
“happen to exist” interpretation and critiquing opponents’ use of early historical sources); Herz, 
supra note 19, at 445-47 (arguing that although the text may support a “happen to arise” interpreta-
tion, because of the text’s ambiguity, “considerations of purpose become critical and are sufficient 
to trump the text”); see also Hein, supra note 25, at 258-60 (summarizing the arguments in favor of 
the “happen to exist” interpretation). 
32 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1235-36 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
33 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1501-38 (using historical research to support a more 
restrictive reading of “happen”). For some of the strongest early sources corroborating this 
position, see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
34 See In re Dist. Attorney of U.S., 7 F. Cas. 731, 736, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 3924) (invali-
dating recess appointment of U.S. Attorney because the vacancy did not arise during the recess). 
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before Noel Canning, no appellate court had ever accepted the “happen to 
arise” interpretation.  
Finally, courts have unanimously held that Article III judges can be appointed 
through the recess appointment mechanism.35 This question is not at issue 
in Noel Canning, but the D.C. Circuit’s narrow reading of the Recess 
Appointments Clause could reinvigorate existing resistance to such appoint-
ments. The Supreme Court has never reached this issue, but at least one 
former Justice has hinted at his displeasure with the recess appointments of 
Article III judges.36 The Constitution states that the President shall appoint 
“Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States” 
through Senate confirmation,37 but may also “fill up all Vacancies” through 
recess appointments.38 This clear statement is bolstered by the reality that 
Presidents from Washington onward have made more than 300 recess 
appointments to Article III courts.39 Still, dissenting judges40 and a spirited 
group of commentators41 allege that the practice conflicts with the guarantee 
of judicial independence found in Article III.42 At least some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Article III judges who reach the bench through recess 
appointments occasionally feel political pressure during either their recess 
appointments or subsequent confirmation proceedings.43  
 
35 See, e.g., Evans, 387 F.3d at 1222; Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009-10; Allocco, 305 F.2d at 708-09. 
36 See Evans v. Stephens, 544 U.S. 942, 942-43 (2005) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of 
certiorari) (noting the “significant constitutional questions regarding the President’s intrasession 
appointment of Judge William H. Pryor, Jr.,” and stating that “it would be a mistake to assume 
that our disposition of this petition constitutes a decision on the merits of whether the President 
has the constitutional authority to fill future Article III vacancies”).  
37 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
39 See Herz, supra note 19, at 448-49. Professor Herz calls the textual case for judicial recess 
appointments “awfully clear,” especially when “matched by a consistent practice” reaching back to 
Washington. Id.  
40 See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1033 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental principle of sepa-
ration of powers must prevail over a peripheral concern for governmental efficiency, and core 
constitutional values must prevail over uncritical acceptance of historical practice.”). 
41 See, e.g., Blake Denton, While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a New 
Interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 751, 757 (2009) (using a 
dynamic view of the Constitution to argue that Article III judges should not receive recess 
appointments because of changed realities in the federal judiciary); William Ty Mayton, Recess 
Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 515, 518 (2004) (arguing that 
the power of the executive to make recess appointments should by trumped by the right of 
litigants to be free from judges who may not be truly independent). 
42 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
43 See, e.g., Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr., to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1957), available at 
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Some commentators believe it may be technically constitutional but unwise 
to read the Recess Appointments Clause broadly.44 Others argue that the 
clause provides a much needed safety valve against government gridlock, 
especially in light of Senators’ frequent threats to filibuster Presidential 
nominees.45 The relative lack of case law addressing these questions has also 
prompted some fairly creative interpretations of the clause and imaginative 
suggestions as to how it can be manipulated.46  
The courts that had addressed these questions, however, had consistently 
determined that the recess appointment power could be used to fill vacan-
cies during both intrasession and intersession recesses, to fill vacancies that 
existed prior to the start of the recess in which the appointment was made, 
and to fill vacancies on Article III courts. In a dramatic departure from the 
decisions of those courts—with respect to the two most controversial 
issues—the Noel Canning court held the opposite.  
II. THE CASE: NOEL CANNING V. NLRB 
Chief Judge Sentelle, writing for the majority, acknowledged the sur-
prising outcome of the case when he wrote, “[w]hile the posture of the 
petition is routine, as it developed, our review is not.”47 The case may have 
 
http://www.princeton.edu/aci/cases-pdf/aci3.brennanhearings.pdf (detailing the difficult questions 
about communism that recess appointee Justice Brennan received from Senator Joseph McCarthy 
during his confirmation hearings); JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 164 (1981) (noting that 1960s recess 
appointees to the Fifth Circuit avoided race-related cases until they were confirmed by the Senate). 
44 See, e.g., Diana Gribbon Motz, The Constitutionality and Advisability of Recess Appointments of 
Article III Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1676 (2011) (“The constitutionality of recess appointments 
of Article III judges does not, however, render them wise.”); Note, Recess Appointments to the 
Supreme Court—Constitutional but Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 124, 146-47 (1957) (arguing that 
recess appointments to the Supreme Court are constitutional, but that the President should make 
them “only in cases of clearest emergency”). 
45 See, e.g., Alexander I. Platt, Note, Preserving the Appointments Safety Valve, 30 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 255, 288 (2011) (arguing for an expansive reading of the recess appointment power to 
combat the existing paralysis in Senate advice and consent). 
46 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers 
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 946 (2013) (making the novel argument 
that if the Senate fails to act on an important executive branch nomination—never actually voting 
the nominee up or down—it consents to that nominee taking office); Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate 
Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82, 83 & n.8 
(2007) (proposing a mechanism by which a Senate that wanted to curtail a recess appointee’s time 
in office could simply “convene, immediately terminate its session, and then reconvene instantly”). 
But see Brian C. Kalt, Keeping Recess Appointments in Their Place, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
88, 89-92 (2007) (suggesting that Tillman’s proposal would be inconsistent with the spirit of the 
Constitution and easily circumvented by the President). 
47 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
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originated as a standard labor dispute, but it ultimately came to encompass a 
deeply divisive political quarrel over unanswered questions of executive 
power. If the outcome of Noel Canning stands, it will significantly narrow 
the President’s power to appoint officers. 
A. Controversy Caused by President Obama’s  
January 14, 2012 Recess Appointments 
Every President has used recess appointments to fill official vacancies 
over the past few decades, but President Obama has exercised the power far 
less frequently than his predecessors. Over the course of his time in office, 
President Reagan invoked the recess appointment power 232 times; President 
George H. W. Bush, 78 times; President Clinton, 139 times; President 
George W. Bush, 171 times; and President Obama, just 32 times.48 The 
magnitude of the controversies surrounding these appointments has depended 
on the positions being filled and the partisan balance of the political branches 
at the time of appointment. Presidents as diverse as Reagan, George H. W. 
Bush, and Obama have jealously defended their constitutional right to make 
these appointments.49 
Recently, the President’s ability to make recess appointments has been 
complicated by Congress’s use of pro forma sessions. During these sessions, 
one member enters the chamber to formally gavel in the day’s session, but 
no actual legislative work is done.50 Pro forma sessions previously had been 
used to satisfy the formal requirements of the Adjournments Clause,51 but 
were first used to prevent recess appointments in 2007, when Senate 
 
48 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 4 tbl.1. 
49 See, e.g., Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwith-
standing Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 OLC Memo], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf (asserting the President’s 
right to ignore pro forma sessions in the Senate and make recess appointments); Statement on 
Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1962, 1963 (Oct. 24, 1992) (arguing that 
amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 “must be interpreted so as not to interfere with 
[the President’s] authority under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution to make recess appoint-
ments”); Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1210, 1211 (Aug. 30, 1984) 
(explaining that pending legislation designed to restrict the authority of recess appointees would 
raise “troubling constitutional issues with respect to my recess appointments power”). 
50 For a brief explanation of the evolution of pro forma sessions in this context, see Jeff 
VanDam, Comment, The Kill Switch: The New Battle over Presidential Recess Appointments, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 361, 374-78 (2012). 
51 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, 
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”). 
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Democrats became angered by President Bush’s use of the power.52 President 
Bush accepted the Democratic Senate’s continued use of this tactic and was 
prevented from making a single additional recess appointment for the 
remainder of his term.53 
During the early years of the first Obama Administration, the Demo-
cratic Senate avoided pro forma sessions. In 2010, however, Democrats 
decided to hold pro forma sessions that they believed would preclude recess 
appointments, but would also prevent Senate Republicans from rejecting 
nominees President Obama had already named.54 Eventually, Republicans 
in the House of Representatives began holding their own pro forma ses-
sions,55 which forced the Senate to follow suit due to the formal require-
ments of the Adjournments Clause. 
This state of affairs continued through the end of 2011. On December 17, 
2011, the Senate adopted a unanimous consent agreement that “no business” 
would be conducted until January 23, 2012, but that pro forma sessions 
would be scheduled every three days, including on January 3, 2012.56 On 
January 4, 2012, President Obama ignored the pro forma sessions and made 
four recess appointments, including three to the NLRB, which are at issue 
in Noel Canning.57 The President also released an opinion from the Office of 
Legal Counsel justifying his decision.58 Just eleven months later, President 
Obama’s decision to make the appointments came before the D.C. Circuit 
for constitutional review.  
 
52 See Erin P. Billings, Reid to Keep Senate in Session to Prevent Recess Appointments, ROLL 
CALL (Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-21044-1.html (“Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid . . . has decided to keep the chamber in session over the Thanksgiving break to block 
President Bush from making any unsavory recess appointments while Senators are out of town.”). 
53 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 21-27 tbls.8 & 9 (demonstrating that President Bush 
made no recess appointments—intersession or intrasession—after April 2007). 
54 David M. Herszenhorn, A Rush to Legislate, and to Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/us/politics/01cong.html. 
55 See Jonathan Allen, Senators Ask John Boehner to Help Block Obama Recess Appointments, 
POLITICO (May 25, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55723.html; Peter Schroeder, 
GOP Freshmen: Stop Recess Appointments by Stopping Recess, THE HILL (June 13, 2011, 2:47 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/166097-gopfreshmen-no-obama-
recess-appointments (explaining the thinking of House Republicans in preventing Congressional recesses). 
56 157 CONG. REC. S8783-84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011). The Senate’s January 3, 2012 session 
was constitutionally mandated. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress shall assemble 
at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless 
they shall by law appoint a different day.”). 
57 See Recess Appointment Press Release, supra note 1. 
58 See 2012 OLC Memo, supra note 49. 
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B. Factual and Procedural Background 
The disagreement at the core of the case arose from a labor dispute between 
Noel Canning, a Pepsi-Cola bottler and distributor, and the local Teamsters 
union.59 The union claimed Noel Canning engaged in unfair labor practices 
and violated federal law when it refused to execute a verbally agreed-upon 
collective bargaining agreement.60  The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
agreed and ruled for the union.61 On February 8, 2012, little more than a 
month after the President’s recess appointments of the three new NLRB 
members, the NLRB affirmed the decision of the ALJ.62 Noel Canning 
petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit and the NLRB cross-petitioned to 
guarantee enforcement of its order.63 Before the D.C. Circuit, Noel Canning 
stated its constitutional objections to the recess appointments of three of 
the NLRB’s members. Because the Supreme Court has held that the NLRB 
must have a quorum of three of its five members to issue valid decisions, a 
successful challenge to the three recess appointments would invalidate the 
NLRB’s ruling.64 
C. Opinion of the D.C. Circuit 
Chief Judge Sentelle, writing for the court, first had to perform a “rou-
tine review” of the two statutory claims raised by the Noel Canning company.65 
The court rejected Noel Canning’s claim that the NLRB’s factual finding of 
an agreement between the union and the company was not supported by 
substantial evidence, citing the deference owed to an ALJ on questions of 
creditability.66 The court also refused to consider Noel Canning’s argument 
that the ALJ erred by declining to apply Washington state law to determine 
 
59 See Noel Canning, a Div. of the Noel Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 3 (Feb. 8, 2012), vacated, 
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
60 Id. The union claimed Noel Canning violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (2006) (declaring that it is an unfair labor 
practice to, among other things, “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of ”  
their statutory rights or “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of ”  the employees). 
61 Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 at 8. 
62 Id. at 1.  
63 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 492. 
64 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010) (holding that the 
NLRB could not exercise its authority once its membership had fallen to two and noting, “we find 
that the Board quorum requirement and the three-member delegation clause should not be read as 
easily surmounted technical obstacles of little to no import”). 
65 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 493 (noting that courts must avoid deciding a constitutional 
question “if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of ”  
(quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))). 
66 See id. at 493-96. 
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whether the contract could be enforced.67 Because the company had not 
raised this issue as an exception before the NLRB, the court found that it 
lacked jurisdiction “to hear any ‘objection that has not been urged before the 
Board.’”68 After finding that the case could not be resolved on either of the 
statutory points, Chief Judge Sentelle turned to the constitutional questions. 
Noel Canning had not raised its constitutional claims before the NLRB 
either, however. Normally this defect would have deprived the court of 
jurisdiction, but it found that the company’s failure to raise the constitu-
tional claims fell within the exception for “extraordinary circumstances” 
provided by section 10(e) of the NLRA.69 The court noted the “serious 
argument” against its jurisdiction,70  but reasoned that the constitutional 
claims “raise questions that go to the very power of the Board to act and 
implicate fundamental separation of powers concerns.”71 The opinion cites 
Supreme Court dicta to support its argument that “‘if the Board has 
patently traveled outside the orbit of its authority so that there is, legally 
speaking, no order to enforce,’ a reviewing court can not enter an order of 
enforcement.” 72  If there is no quorum, the NLRB’s orbit of authority 
shrinks to nothing and any act is beyond its proper scope. 
After establishing that it had jurisdiction, the court reached the core of 
the case. The court chose to answer two constitutional questions. First, for 
the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, what does “the Recess” 
mean? Second, does the clause mean that the President can fill vacancies 
that “happen to exist” during the recess or only those that “happen to arise” 
during this period?  
1. The Meaning of “the Recess” 
First, the court considered the language and structure of the Recess 
Appointments Clause to determine whether “the Recess” allows appoint-
ments during intrasession recesses or only during intersession breaks. 
The court began its analysis of this issue by noting the “difference between 
the word choice ‘recess’ and ‘the Recess,’”73 the latter having been selected 
by the Framers. The court found this “not an insignificant distinction” 
 
67 Id. at 496. 
68 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006)).  
69 See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), which notes that the failure to raise an objection before 
the Board may “be excused because of extraordinary circumstances”). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 497. 
72 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946)).  
73 Id. at 500. 
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because the use of a definite article suggests that the Constitution is referring 
to “‘a particular thing.’”74 The court was careful to use contemporaneous 
dictionaries to reach this conclusion, because it believed proper constitu-
tional interpretation “must look to the natural meaning of the text as it 
would have been understood at the time of the ratification.”75 
The court then drew a distinction between the Constitution’s use of the 
terms “adjourn” or “adjournment”—meaning a break in congressional proceed-
ings generally—and the more selective use of “the Recess”—meaning some-
thing special and specific, more than a simple adjournment.76 This distinction is 
further emphasized by the court’s next point. It argued that the clause’s 
statement that recess appointments expire “at the End of [the Senate’s] next 
Session” implies a structural dichotomy.77 Either the Senate is in “the Recess” 
or it is in “Session,” suggesting that intrasession breaks, no matter how long, fall 
outside the meaning of the clause. Here the court provided contemporaneous 
support in the form of a bill from the First Congress that set pay for a clerk at 
“two dollars per day during the session, with the like compensation . . . while 
he shall be necessarily employed in the recess.”78 
After finding that the language and structure of the clause suggest a spe-
cific, narrow reading of “the Recess,” the court turned to Founding-era 
history. Few sources are directly on point, but the court pointed to Alexander 
Hamilton’s statement in the Federalist Papers that recess appointments 
terminate “at the end of the ensuing session.”79 In the court’s view, “[f ] or 
there to be an ‘ensuing session,’ it seems likely to the point of near certainty 
that recess appointments were being made at a time when the Senate was 
not in session.”80 Because of the scarcity of Founding-era writings on the 
meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, the court examined interpre-
tations of similar state constitutional provisions.81 The court argued that the 
 
74 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2041 (1755)).  
75 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008)). 
76 Id. In addition to the Recess Appointments Clause, “the Recess” appears in only one other 
place—the Senate Vacancies Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVII. 
77 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3).  
78 Id. (quoting Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 Stat. 70, 71). 
79 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 2003)). 
80 Id. at 500-01. 
81 For the court’s justification of this interpretive approach, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 
��� S. Ct. ����, ���� (����), in which the Supreme Court confirmed its interpretation of the 
Second Amendment through a review of “analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions,” 
and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990), where the Court observed that “[s]everal early 
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North Carolina Constitution is similar in language and structure,82 and that 
an 1819 decision from the North Carolina Supreme Court “implies that the 
provision was seen as differentiating between ‘the session of the General 
Assembly’ and ‘the recess of the General Assembly.’”83 Notably, however, 
that case did not attempt to define the meaning of “recess”; instead it 
addressed the question of whether the governor could fill a position if the 
vacancy arose while the state’s general assembly was in session.84  
Although the NLRB framed its arguments in light of presidents’ fre-
quent use of recess appointments, both intrasession and intersession, the 
court maintained that “the historical role of the Recess Appointments 
Clause is neither clear nor consistent.”85 By focusing its analysis on the 
practice and interpretation “in the years immediately following the Consti-
tution’s ratification,”86 the court was able to disregard the prolific use of 
both intrasession and intersession recess appointments in more recent 
times. The court noted that the first intrasession appointment was not made 
until 1867,87 and that only three such appointments were made before 1947.88 
The fact that the executive rarely filled vacancies during intrasession recesses 
“‘suggests an assumed absence of [the] power’ to make such appointments.”89  
The court drew on INS v. Chadha90 to strengthen its refusal to consider 
the behavior of recent administrations.91 While invalidating the use of the 
 
State Constitutions . . . appear to have been a basis for the Framers’ understanding of the [Ex 
Post Facto Clause].”  
82 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501. To support this claim, the court cites Thomas A. Curtis, 
Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1770-72 (1984), which argues that a provision of the 
North Carolina Constitution served as the model for the Recess Appointments Clause. 
83 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501 (quoting Beard v. Cameron, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 181, 184-85 
(1819) (opinion of Taylor, C.J.)).  
84 See Beard, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) at 181. Notably, the North Carolina Constitution did not use a 
definite article before “recess.” See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XX (giving the governor recess 
appointment power “in every case where any officer, the right of whose appointment is by this 
Constitution vested in the General Assembly, shall, during their recess, die, or his office by other 
means become vacant”), reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS 406 (William F. Swindler ed., 1978). 
85 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. (citing Hartnett, supra note 24, at 408-09). 
88 Id. at 502 (citing Carrier, supra note 27, at 2209-12, 2235). Of course, the lack of intrases-
sion recess appointments may simply be the result of the rarity of intrasession recesses in the early 
years of the Republic. See Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1565 (“[Before the Civil War,] Congress rarely 
took an intrasession recess, doing so only in 1800, 1817, and 1828, each time for at most one week.”).  
89 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502 (alteration in original) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 908 (1997)). 
90 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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one-house veto, the Chadha Court said, “our inquiry is sharpened rather 
than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing 
with increasing frequency.”92 The court in Noel Canning framed its conclu-
sion in the same way—historical acquiescence to an unconstitutional 
practice does not make the practice permissible.93 
Next, the court attempted to situate the Recess Appointments Clause in 
its broader view of the proper separation of powers, calling recess appoint-
ments a “stopgap.”94 This characterization is based on Hamilton’s explana-
tion that Senate confirmation “declares the general mode of appointing 
officers of the United States,” while recess appointments are “nothing more 
than a supplement” or an “auxiliary method.”95 This stopgap method was 
necessary when intersession recesses “were regularly six to nine months.”96 
Allowing the auxiliary path to swallow the general process would violate the 
“careful separation of powers structure reflected in the Appointments 
Clause.”97 The opinion points to the Supreme Court’s observation that the 
“manipulation of official appointments had long been one of the American 
revolutionary generation’s greatest grievances against executive power” to 
support its separation-of-powers argument that the Recess Appointments 
Clause should be read narrowly to apply to intersession recesses only.98 
The court then considered and rejected four alternative explanations for 
what “the Recess” might mean. The first, that recess appointments are 
constitutionally permitted during any break of the Senate, even for the 
weekend or for lunch, was rejected out of hand because it would turn the 
normal process “upside down.”99 The court also rejected a second alternative 
which would allow recess appointments during any “substantial passage of 
time, such as a ten- or twenty-day break” 100  because that definition is 
 
91 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502. 
92 ��� U.S. at ���. The Ninth Circuit also considered the effect of Chadha when it analyzed 
the use of intrasession recess appointments, but tempered Chadha’s effect with the Supreme 
Court’s contemporaneous decision Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in which the Court 
used longstanding history as a guide to the Constitution’s meaning. See United States v. Woodley, 
751 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792). But see id. at 1024-26 
(Norris, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority’s treatment of Chadha and Marsh). 
93 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 502-03 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 79, at 408). 
96 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 503 (citing Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1498).  
97 Id. 
98 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991)). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 503-04. The court attributes this definition of an acceptable recess to former Attorney 
General Harry M. Daugherty. See Exec. Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 22 (1921). 
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“flimsy”101 and fails to “establish[ ] high walls and clear distinctions,” which 
are necessary to police “the heat of interbranch conflict.”102 Third, the court 
rejected an approach that links an appropriate recess to “any adjournment of 
more than three days pursuant to the Adjournments Clause,”103 because the 
two clauses “exist in different contexts and contain no hint that they should 
be read together.”104 Finally, the court rejected the “functional interpreta-
tion in which the President has discretion” to determine when an appropriate 
recess exists, because it would “demolish the checks and balances inherent in 
the advice-and-consent requirement.”105 
The court put a final punctuation mark on this portion of its analysis by 
reminding the other branches of government that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”106 The 
court has decided that the original language and purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause do not allow for appointments during intrasession 
recesses, and no amount of executive practice or congressional acquiescence 
can alter that meaning.  
2. The Meaning of “Happen” 
It is absolutely clear that President Obama’s January 4, 2012 recess appoint-
ments to the NLRB occurred during an intrasession recess, so the court 
could have resolved the dispute and ended the case here.107 The majority 
acknowledged that its “holding on the first constitutional argument . . . is 
sufficient to compel a decision vacating the Board’s order,” but addressed 
the second question, nonetheless.108 
 
101 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 504. 
102 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995)). 
103 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Con-
gress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”)). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. The Court attributes the proposed functional interpretation to the 2012 OLC memo 
that President Obama relied on to make the recess appointments at question in this case. See 2012 
OLC Memo, supra note 49, at 13 (“[W]e conclude that the President may determine that pro 
forma sessions at which no business is to be conducted do not interrupt a Senate recess for 
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause.”). 
106 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The court also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952), for the proposition that “the courts must make the same determination [as to the 
operation of conflicting laws] if the executive has acted contrary to the Constitution.” Noel 
Canning, 705 F.3d at 506.  
107 This concern was raised by Judge Griffith in his concurring opinion. See infra Part II.D.  
108 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507. 
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The NLRB argued that “Vacancies that may happen during the Recess”109 
encompass vacancies that “happen to exist” during the Recess, while Noel 
Canning urged the court to read the clause as referring to vacancies that 
“arise,” “begin,” or “come into being” during the Recess.110 The majority 
sided with the company.  
As with the first issue, the court’s analysis began with a consideration of 
the “natural meaning of the text as it would have been understood at the 
time of the ratification.” 111  The court first reasoned that interpreting 
“happen” to mean “happen to exist” would make the entire phrase inopera-
tive and superfluous; had that meaning been intended, the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause could have been simplified to allow the filling of Vacancies 
during the Recess.112 The court noted the well-established principle that 
“every phrase of the Constitution must be given effect.”113 
The court then looked to dictionaries from the era of the Founders to 
support its interpretation.114 It found support in one definition of “happen” 
as “[t]o fall out; to chance; to come to pass.”115 This definition suggests an 
action actively occurring, which led the court to conclude that only vacancies 
that arise during the recess can validly be filled through recess appointments.  
Next, the court restated its structural separation-of-powers argument. If 
the President can fill any existing vacancy, he or she can simply wait for the 
Senate to recess (whatever meaning that term is given) and short-circuit 
“the primary method of appointment,” that is, “the cumbersome advice and 
consent procedure.”116 
The Constitution contains another use of the term “happen.” Before 
Senators were directly elected by voters, the Senate Vacancies Clause read, 
“and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of 
the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary 
 
109 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.  
110 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008)). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)). 
114 See id. The court cites Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1230 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting), with approval of the dissenting judge’s examination of contempora-
neous dictionaries. For an argument in favor of the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation, 
see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 415-24 (2012). But see Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon 
Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 
264-276 (1999) (critiquing certain judicial methods of using dictionaries). 
115 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 JOHNSON, supra note 74, 
at 965). 
116 Id. at 508. 
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Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then 
fill such Vacancies.”117 
The court reasoned that this clause is only intelligible if “happen” means 
“arise.” 118  Because similar terms in the Constitution should be treated 
consistently whenever possible, “happen” must also mean “arise” for the 
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause.”119 
Here, the court was able to draw support for its interpretation from con-
temporaneous explanations of the clause. The court pointed to Edmund 
Randolph,120 who addressed this question as early as 1792, while serving as 
the first U.S. Attorney General.121 Randolph rejected the “exist” reading, 
asking of a potential recess appointment: “But is it a vacancy which has 
happened during the recess of the Senate? It is now the same and no other 
vacancy, than that, which existed on the 2nd. of April 1792. It commenced 
therefore on that day or may be said to have happened on that day.”122 As the 
court noted,123 Hamilton seemed to reach a similar conclusion, writing, “[i]t is 
clear, that independent of authority of a special law, the President cannot fill a 
vacancy which happens during a session of the Senate.”124  
The court quite honestly admitted that several other circuits had rejected 
the “arise” interpretation in favor of one that would allow the President to 
fill vacancies that happen to “exist.”125 The court discounted those decisions 
for a number of reasons. First, at least one of those courts had used a 
contemporary dictionary to determine the meaning of “happen,” which is 
anathema to the D.C. Circuit’s originalist perspective.126 The court also 
relied on a recent historical study to counter the Eleventh Circuit’s finding 
that Presidents Washington and Jefferson both made appointments to 
 
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
118 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 508. 
119 Id. (citing Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 587 (1949)). 
120 Id. at 508-09. 
121 See Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165, 165-67 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990). 
122 Id. at 166.  
123 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 509. 
124 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3, 1799), in 23 THE PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 94, 94 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1976). 
125 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 509 (citing Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 
2004) (en banc); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); and 
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709-15 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
126 See id. at 509 (criticizing Evans). 
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vacancies that did not arise during the relevant recess.127 Next, the court 
criticized the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits for their consideration 
of a federal statute that permits payment to certain recess appointees who 
have filled vacancies that arose while the Senate was in session.128 Those 
circuits treated the statute as an example of congressional acquiescence to 
recess appointments filling existing vacancies, but Noel Canning rejected 
that argument because the statute is too recent and an older version of the 
same statute entirely forbade payments to that type of appointee.129 The 
court characterized this older statute as Congress’s attempt to use the power 
of the purse to curb a practice it found improper or unconstitutional.130 
The majority opinion in Noel Canning is most forceful when it returns to 
its separation-of-powers argument. If the Constitution does not allow the 
filling of vacancies that arise sometime other than during the recess, 
“‘[n]either Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive . . . structural 
protection[s]’ in the Appointments Clause.”131 In the court’s view, constitu-
tional boundaries are not affected by prior practice, especially because 
“structural provisions serve to protect the people.”132 Allowing the President to 
fill vacancies that only “exist” threatens this structure and, according to the 
court, could therefore threaten the people through executive aggrandizement.  
The court admitted that its decision may lead to inefficiency,133 but it 
clearly prioritized its originalist view of the Recess Appointments Clause by 
countering that “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objec-
tives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.” 134  And of course, 
reasoned the court, if Congress wanted to make the process more efficient, 
 
127 See id. at 509-10 (noting that the Presidents’ practice was to appoint an individual without 
his consent, making a recess appointment if the individual turned down the appointment during 
the recess (citing Rappaport, supra note 27, at 1522 n.97)).  
128 See id. at 510 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2006)). 
129 See id. The current statutory language of § 5503 became law in 1966. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 475. Chief Judge Sentelle pointed to an earlier iteration of the 
statute which forbid payment  
as salary, to any person appointed during the recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in 
any existing office, which vacancy existed while the Senate was in session and is by 
law required to be filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, until such 
appointee shall have been confirmed by the Senate.  
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 510 (quoting Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 642, 646). 
130 See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 510. 
131 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991)). 
132 Id. 
133 See id. at 511 (“Our sister circuits and the Board contend that the ‘arise’ interpretation 
fosters inefficiencies and leaves open the possibility of just what is occurring here—that is, a Board 
that cannot act . . . .”). 
134 Id. (alternation in original) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
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it could provide for acting members on the NLRB 135  or allow exiting 
members to continue serving until a replacement is properly appointed.136  
The court’s decision appears to be driven by its choice to treat the sepa-
ration of powers—as it believes the Founders understood that concept—as 
the ultimate touchstone. The fact that the court’s holding on this second 
constitutional question, when paired with its holding on the first, threatens 
to completely obliterate recess appointments does not matter. The values of 
pragmatism and efficiency are dramatically lesser concerns. Because the court 
held that the Recess Appointments Clause only allows the President to fill 
vacancies that “happen to arise” during the recess, each of President Obama’s 
three appointments to the NLRB was invalidated on a second ground.137  
D. Judge Griffith’s Concurrence 
Judge Griffith filed a short, but important concurrence in the case.138 
Although he concurred in the judgment and agreed with the majority 
opinion’s rejection of intrasession recess appointments, Judge Griffith 
would not have reached the issue of when vacancies must “happen.” He 
pointed out that the majority “acknowledges that our holding on intrases-
sion recess appointments is sufficient to vacate the Board’s order”139 and 
 
135 See id. (pointing to a number of examples where Congress has permitted an acting agency 
head (citing 10 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006) (Secretary of Defense); id. § 154(d), (e) (Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff); �� U.S.C. § ��� (����) (Attorney General); �� U.S.C. § ��� (2006) (Secretary of 
Labor); 50 U.S.C. § 403-3a(a) (2006) (Director of National Intelligence); and id. § 403-4c(b)(2) 
(Supp. IV 2011) (Director of the Central Intelligence Agency))).  
136 See id. (noting several instances in which Congress has permitted this mechanism (citing 
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (2006) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) 
(2006) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2006) (Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission); and 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2006) (Federal Communications Commission))). 
137 The court went on to apply its newly created definition of “happen” to each of the three 
NLRB appointees. Two had filled vacancies created during intrasession recesses several months 
before the recess during which they were appointed. See id. at 512 (citing U.S. GOV’T PRINTING 
OFFICE, OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 112TH CONGRESS 538 (2011)). The 
vacancy filled by the third appointee is more complicated. That individual filled a vacancy created 
by the expiration of a separate, earlier recess appointment. See id. at 498, 512. The Senate 
“declined to adjourn sine die[, officially ending the session],” so the First Session of the ���th 
Congress ended at the same time the Second Session began, with no intersession recess. Id. at 513. 
The court was therefore forced to engage in logical gymnastics to argue that “the Clause states 
that a recess appointment expires ‘at the End of [the Senate's] next Session,’ not ‘at the beginning 
of the Senate's next Recess’” to reach the conclusion that the vacancy did not arise during a recess. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3). Whether the Founding 
Fathers would have acknowledged this fine distinction is unclear.  
138 Id. at ��� (Griffith, J., concurring). 
139 Id. 
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argued, “[i]f we need not take up a constitutional issue, we should not.”140 
Although Judge Griffith found the government’s position that the President 
could fill vacancies that “happen to exist” during a recess “suspect,” he noted 
that the practice traces back to the 1820s and the judiciary “should not dismiss 
another branch’s longstanding interpretation of the Constitution when the case 
before us does not demand it.”141 If the Supreme Court wants to limit the 
President’s power to grant recess appointments without completely neutering 
the clause, Judge Griffith’s concurrence provides one path to that result. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The impact of Noel Canning is significant, but its ultimate reach is unclear. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning could soon supplant the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision. Although the opinion only binds cases in the D.C. Circuit, the 
organic statutes of a number of federal agencies, notably the NLRB, create 
rights of appeal to that court.142 The decision has drawn particular attention 
because it appears to undermine the authority of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) by invalidating the appointment of the agency’s 
first Director, Richard Cordray,143 who was appointed the same day as the 
NLRB members involved in Noel Canning.144 Senators eventually reached 
an agreement to confirm Cordray 145  and members of the NLRB 146  in 
 
140 Id. (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981); and Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 
288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
141 Id. 
142 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(f )  (2006) (granting “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of 
the [NLRB]” the right to appeal that order to the D.C. Circuit). 
143 See Savage & Greenhouse, supra note 14 (“The decision also casts a cloud over Mr. 
Cordray’s appointment.”). 
144 See Recess Appointment Press Release, supra note 1. 
145 See Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
WASH. POST ( July 16, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-16/business/40608755_1_ 
senate-republicans-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-richard-cordray. 
146 See Michael A. Memoli, Senate Confirms Obama Choices for National Labor Relations Board, 
L.A. TIMES ( July 30, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-pn-nlrb-senate-votes-
��������,�,�������.story (noting the confirmation of nominees Kent Hirozawa and Nancy 
Schiffer). None of the three recess appointees that figured in Noel Canning remain on the Board, 
however: the White House withdrew the nominations of Richard Griffin and Sharon Block, while 
Terence Flynn, the President’s third NLRB recess appointee, resigned in May 2012. See Steven 
Greenhouse, Labor Board Member Resigns Over Leak to G.O.P. Allies, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/business/gop-labor-board-member-terence-flynn-quits-over-
leak.html; Josh Hicks, How Obama’s NLRB Nominees Became Central to Senate Filibuster Debate, 
WASH. POST ( July 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/07/17/ 
how-obamas-nlrb-nominees-became-central-to-the-senates-filibuster-deal. 
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exchange for leaving the filibuster rules in place.147 These confirmations 
ended a political crisis, but legal questions about the preconfirmation acts of 
the CFPB and NLRB must be resolved by the Supreme Court or in 
subsequent litigation.  
A. Impact on the NLRB  
The day Noel Canning was decided, the NLRB issued a defiant statement 
“respectfully disagree[ing]” with the ruling and promising to “continue to 
perform our statutory duties and issue decisions.”148 White House Press 
Secretary Jay Carney echoed the NLRB’s sentiment, criticized the opinion, 
and said, “It’s one court, one case, one company.”149 Although Carney’s 
statement is technically true, it dramatically understates the potential 
ramifications for NLRB actions if Noel Canning remains the law. 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) grants aggrieved parties a 
right to appeal all decisions of the NLRB to the D.C. Circuit.150 Because 
future panels of the D.C. Circuit will be bound by the legal reasoning of the 
Noel Canning court,151 all NLRB actions that took place after the recess 
appointments in January 2012 and before the Senate confirmed NLRB 
members in July are vulnerable to litigation. Companies across the country 
have relied on Noel Canning to challenge or ignore the NLRB.152 The clear 
circuit split created by the D.C. Circuit’s decision also provides strong 
incentives for forum shopping.153 The NLRA allows parties to appeal either 
to the D.C. Circuit or to any “circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in 
 
147 See Memoli, supra note 146. 
148 Press Release, Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman, NLRB, Statement on Recess Appoint-
ment Ruling (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-releases/statement- 
chairman-pearce-recess-appointment-ruling. 
149 Donovan Slack, White House Blasts Recess Appointments Ruling, POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/wh-blasts-recess-appointments-ruling-86737.html. 
150 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f ) .  
151 See 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3981.1 (4th ed. 2008) (“The courts of appeals generally follow a practice that one panel is bound 
by the holdings in a prior decision of another panel of that court.”). 
152 See Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, Companies Challenge Labor Rulings, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324034804578346700152526718.html 
(noting that since the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, “at least 87 companies and three unions have cited the 
decision in cases at varying stages within the agency”). 
153 See Joel Barras, Coin Toss May Decide New Appeals of NLRB Decisions, FORBES (Feb. 25, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2013/02/25/coin-toss-may-decide-new-appeals- 
of-nlrb-decisions (“If the circuit courts differ on the validity of the NLRB recess appointees, an 
employer’s appeal of an NLRB decision may turn solely on the circuit court that decides the 
appeal . . . .”). 
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question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides 
or transacts business,”154 but it also allows the NLRB to seek enforcement of 
its decisions in those same courts.155  
Both dissatisfied parties and the NLRB have strong incentives to forum 
shop, which has particularly perverse consequences in this context. When 
“proceedings are instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to 
the same order,”156 there are a number of possible outcomes. The process 
favors early filers,157 but the strangest case occurs when multiple petitions 
for review are filed in different circuits within ten days of the order. Then, 
the agency sends the case to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
which chooses a circuit “by means of random selection.”158 The decision to 
enforce or invalidate an NLRB order could, quite literally, be determined 
by the flip of a coin. 
A party’s failure to raise the constitutional recess appointments claim in 
prior proceedings before an ALJ or the NLRB is unlikely to bar relief. The 
Noel Canning company did not raise its challenge to the NLRB’s quorum 
until it was before the D.C. Circuit, where the Court held that “failure to 
urge the objection before the Board comes within the exception for ‘extraor-
dinary circumstances.’”159  
The NLRB may attempt to defend its actions with the de facto officer 
doctrine, which confers legitimacy on actions of officers acting under 
apparent authority, even when it is later discovered that their election or 
appointment was improper.160 But, the Supreme Court has significantly 
narrowed the reach of that doctrine. In Ryder v. United States,161 the Court 
considered a criminal conviction before the Coast Guard Court of Military 
Review where the appointment of two of the panel’s judges had failed to 
 
154 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).  
155 See id. § 160(e) (“The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United 
States . . . .”).  
156 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2006); see also UAW v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 276, 277 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(laying out the § 2112(a) procedure). 
157 If only one party files for appeal within ten days of a decision, the appeal will be heard in 
the venue chosen by the filer. See 28 U.S.C § ����(a)(�). If no appeal is filed within ten days, the 
first party to file after that point chooses the venue. Id.  
158 Id. § 2112(a)(3). 
159 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 
(2013) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)); see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
160 See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441-42 (1886) (“The doctrine which 
gives validity to acts of officers de facto, whatever defects there may be in the legality of their 
appointment or election, is founded upon considerations of policy and necessity . . . . It is 
manifest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding before such officers their title 
could be called in question.”). 
161 515 U.S. 177 (1995). 
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meet the requirements of the Appointments Clause. The majority held that 
the de facto officer doctrine did not apply because the defendant’s claim “is 
based on the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution—a claim 
that there has been a ‘trespass upon the executive power of appointment.’”162  
Almost immediately after the Noel Canning ruling, at least one hospital 
chain based in California announced that it would ignore decisions issued 
by the NLRB during the period when three of the Board’s members served 
due to recess appointments.163 If Noel Canning remains the law of the land, 
all NLRB decisions issued between January 4, 2012 and July 30, 2013 appear 
subject to challenge.  
B. Impact on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
As soon as Noel Canning was decided, media and critics of the CFPB 
questioned the legitimacy of Richard Cordray’s recess appointment. 164 
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell argued that the “decision now 
casts serious doubt on whether the President’s ‘recess’ appointment of 
Richard Cordray to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau . . . is 
constitutional.”165 White House Press Secretary Jay Carney maintained that 
the ruling “has no bearing on Richard Cordray,”166 but Cordray, like the 
NLRB members, is clearly an “Officer[] of the United States”167 under the 
 
162 Id. at 182 (quoting McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 598 (1895)). 
163 See Terry Baynes, Exclusive: Hospital Chain Defies NLRB Rulings After Court Decision, 
REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/us-nlrb-hospital-idUSBRE 
91001320130201. 
164 See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Steven Mufson, Court Says Obama Exceeded Authority in Making 
Appointments, WASH. POST ( J an. 25, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-25/politics/ 
36541588_1_recess-appointments-richard-cordray-president-obama (“The ruling also raises 
questions about the recess appointment of former Ohio attorney general Richard Cordray to head 
the fledgling Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and about the actions taken by the agency 
during his tenure . . . .”); Press Release, Eric Cantor, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Leader Cantor: A Step Closer to Achieving Transparency & Oversight of NLRB & CFPB 
(Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://majorityleader.gov/newsroom/2013/01/leader-cantor-a-step-
closer-to-achieving-transparency-oversight-of-nlrb-cfpb.html (asserting that the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion declared President Obama’s appointment of Cordray unconstitutional).  
165 Press Release, Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Court Rules President 
Obama’s NLRB ‘Recess’ Appointments Are Unconstitutional (Jan. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=ea415ca
6-0919-4f34-95ec-e9d0d812fc20. 
166 See Peter Schroeder, McConnell: NLRB Ruling Casts ‘Serious Doubt’ on Cordray Appoint-
ment, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-
financial-institutions/279349-mcconnell-nlrb-ruling-casts-serious-doubt-on-cordray (quoting Carney). 
167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Constitution, and there is no obvious reason why Noel Canning’s logic would 
not apply to his appointment.  
The CFPB was created by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act.168 Congress fashioned the CFPB to 
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or 
services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”169 It was a response to 
the financial distress wreaked on many citizens by consumer financial 
products during the recent economic crisis.170  
Republicans have criticized the CFPB since it came into existence.171 
President Obama’s decision to appoint Cordray through a recess appoint-
ment was prompted by a Republican filibuster of Cordray’s nomination.172 
In 2012, Cordray’s appointment and other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act 
were challenged in a lawsuit filed by a Texas bank and two Washington, 
D.C.-based business interest groups. 173  Several state attorneys general 
subsequently joined as plaintiffs.174 Although the district court ultimately 
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on standing and ripeness grounds,175 if the Texas 
bank (on appeal) or some other plaintiff eventually reaches the merits of 
Cordray’s appointment, it will likely prevail.  
 
168 Pub. L. No. 111-���, ��� Stat. ���� (����) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.) [here-
inafter Dodd-Frank Act]; see also Linda Singer et al., Breaking Down Financial Reform: A Summary 
of the Major Consumer Protection Portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 2 (2010) (providing a detailed exploration of Dodd-Frank). 
169 Dodd-Frank Act § ����(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a)). 
170 See Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regula-
tion for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1144-45 (2012) (describing the 
financial crisis as the impetus for the creation of the CFPB). 
171 See, e.g., Raghav Ahuja, Comment, Constitutional in Name: The Bureau of Consumer Finan-
cial Protection and the Obama Administration's Treatment of the Nondelegation Principle and the 
Appointments Clause, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 272 (2011) (“Republicans in the House of 
Representatives have introduced at least four bills aimed at limiting the Bureau's powers, and 
numerous Republican Senators have threatened to filibuster the appointment of a permanent 
Bureau director.” (footnotes omitted)). 
172 See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordray-
named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html. 
173 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 1-7, State Nat’l Bank of Big 
Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. June 21, 2012), decided sub nom. State Nat’l Bank of 
Big Spring v. Lew, 2013 WL 3945027 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013) (presenting several arguments, among 
them that the CFPB violates the constitutional nondelegation doctrine and that Cordray’s 
appointment was unconstitutional). But see Ahuja, supra note 171, at 272 (arguing that Congress’s 
delegation of power to the CFPB and President Obama’s recess appointment of Elizabeth Warren 
as Special Advisor for the CFPB were constitutional, even if questionable). 
174 See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 23-28, State Nat’l 
Bank, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012). 
175 See State Nat’l Bank, 2013 WL 3945027, at *7-8. 
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The result of that hypothetical challenge to CFPB action is somewhat 
more complex than the result of the NLRB challenge. The CFPB is empow-
ered to both take over the consumer protection duties of existing financial 
regulatory agencies176 and to exercise new powers created by Dodd-Frank.177 
Until a Director takes control of the Bureau, the Secretary of the Treasury 
is authorized to exercise the powers transferred to the CFPB from other 
agencies.178 The Inspectors General of the Federal Reserve and Department 
of Treasury found that those powers transferred to the CFPB on July 21, 
2011. 179  These transferred powers included the authority to issue rules, 
orders, and guidances that could have been made by the transferring agencies, 
but did not include the authority to “prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
acts or practices” under Dodd-Frank’s new coverage of consumer financial 
products or to ensure that features of those products “are fairly, accurately, 
and effectively disclosed” by providers.180 The CFPB would also be prevented 
from regulating nondepository institutions until a Director took power.181  
The CFPB’s actions since January 4, 2012 are thus challengeable for two 
reasons. First, the exercise of the CFPB’s new powers will be voidable 
because the congressional delegation of that authority was dependent on the 
lawful appointment of a Director. Second, any CFPB actions that could have 
been made by the Secretary of the Treasury in the interim period before a 
Director took office will be voidable because those actions were taken by 
Cordray, not the Secretary. It will also be impossible for the CFPB to claim 
that its actions were made by an acting director, because Dodd-Frank 
requires the holder of that position to “be appointed by the Director,”182 
who, under Noel Canning’s logic, was never properly appointed himself.  
 
176 Specifically, the CFPB assumed all consumer protection functions of the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the 
National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as well as 
some responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b)(1)-(7) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)-(7)). 
177 At the core of its authority, the CFPB is empowered to issue regulations and take enforce-
ment action to prevent “an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice . . . in connection with any 
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer 
financial product or service.” Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)).  
178 See Dodd-Frank Act § ����(a) (to be codified at �� U.S.C. § ����(a)). 
179 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT., OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REVIEW OF CFPB 
IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES 2-4 (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/oig/files/OIG_����_Review_of_CFPB_Implementation_Planning_Activities.pdf. 
180 Id. at 3-4. 
181 Id. at 4. 
182 Dodd-Frank Act § ����(b)(�) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)). 
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If Noel Canning remains law, all of the CFPB’s actions since Cordray’s 
recess appointment could potentially be vulnerable to challenge. Despite 
initial signs that Republicans would continue to prevent the appointment of 
a Director, 183  the Senate’s official confirmation of Cordray in July ���� 
should insulate future CFPB action from attack. 
C. Potential Impact on the Federal Judiciary 
Of course, Noel Canning did not directly address the recess appointment 
of Article III judges, but the decision’s reasoning would seem to apply with 
equal force in that context. Since the Reagan Administration, only three 
Article III judges have taken the bench through recess appointments,184 but 
more than 300 such appointments have been made throughout the history 
of the United States.185 
 President Clinton appointed Judge Roger Gregory to a position on the 
Fourth Circuit during an intersession recess in December 2000.186 Gregory 
was later nominated to the same seat by President George W. Bush and 
confirmed by the Senate,187 but because he was appointed to a newly created 
seat188 that had been vacant long before the recess began, his service in the 
interim would be unconstitutional under Noel Canning. President Bush’s 
intersession recess appointment of Judge Charles W. Pickering to the Fifth 
Circuit would be unconstitutional for the same reason.189 Judge William H. 
 
183 See Michael R. Crittenden, Nomination Revives Fight over Consumer Bureau, WSJ.COM 
WASH. WIRE (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/02/13/nomination-
revives-fight-over-consumer-bureau (noting “no willingness” from Republicans to approve 
Cordray’s nomination because “[t]hey simply don’t want that kind of Wall Street oversight” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
184 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 20, 22, 27 (noting the recess appointments of U.S. 
Court of Appeals Judges Roger Gregory, William H. Pryor, and Charles W. Pickering). 
185 Herz, supra note 19, at 449. 
186 Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 20. See generally Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appoint-
ments During the Clinton Presidency: An Inside Perspective, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 40-42 (2003) 
(explaining the Clinton Administration’s procedure and rationale for appointing Judge Gregory). 
187 See Alison Mitchell, Senators Confirm � Judges, Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/21/us/senators-confirm-3-judges-including-once-
stalled-black.html. 
188 The seat was created by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
§ 202(a)(�), ��� Stat. ����, ���� (codified as amended at �� U.S.C. § ��(a) (����)). The Noel 
Canning court did not directly address the issue of recess appointments to a newly created 
position, but its logic suggests no reason to treat those positions differently.  
189 See Hogue Memo, supra note 10, at 27. The seat had been vacant since Judge Henry A. 
Politz assumed senior status in 1999. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Politz, Henry 
Anthony, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.c.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1902 (last visited Sept. 19, 
2013). Judge Pickering was nominated for a permanent position by President Bush, but because 
the Senate refused to confirm him, he resigned as his recess appointment was about to expire. See 
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Pryor’s intrasession recess appointment was upheld in an en banc decision 
of the Eleventh Circuit,190 but would be doubly damned under Noel Canning 
because the vacancy existed before the start of the recess191 and the recess 
occurred in the middle of a session. Eventually, President Bush officially 
nominated Judge Pryor and he was confirmed roughly sixteen months after 
his recess appointment.192 Any ruling he made in the interim period could 
potentially be challenged.193  
If the rationale of Noel Canning becomes binding law nationwide, it 
could contribute to the already disastrous problem of judicial vacancies. 
Notably, the “nuclear option” threatened by Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid would not have altered Senators’ ability to filibuster judicial nomi-
nees.194 Under Noel Canning, a dedicated minority of forty-one Senators 
could theoretically filibuster all judicial nominees and maintain pro forma 
sessions to foreclose any recess appointments. This hypothetical is hardly 
far-fetched considering the recent behavior of both Republican and Demo-
cratic Senate leaders. 195  President George W. Bush promised to cease 
further judicial recess appointments in exchange for confirmation of twenty-
five of his judicial nominees.196 Especially in light of the new forces pulling 
federal judges away from the bench,197 might the effective repeal of the 
Recess Appointments Clause exacerbate the existing vacancy crisis in the 
 
Adam Liptak, A Judge Appointed by Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/10/politics/10pickering.html.  
190 See Evans v. Stephens, ��� F.�d ���� (��th Cir. ����) (en banc) (finding Judge Pryor’s 
recess appointment constitutional and dismissing the reasoning that now forms the basis of the 
decision in Noel Canning). 
191 The seat had been vacant since Judge Emmett R. Cox assumed senior status in 2000. See 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Cox, Emmett Ripley, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ 
servlet/nGetInfo?jid=522 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
192 See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Pryor, William Holcombe Jr., FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.c.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3050 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).  
193 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the de facto officer doctrine.  
194 Senator Reid had threatened to change the Senate’s filibuster rules for executive branch 
nominees to allow for confirmation by a simple majority of fifty-one votes, but the filibuster rules 
for legislation and judicial appointments would have remained unaffected. See Manu Raju et al., 
Senate Heads Toward ‘Nuclear Option,’ POLITICO (July 16, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2013/07/senate-nears-nuclear-option-showdown-94156.html. 
195 See Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 772-73 (2010) 
(exploring the role of increased partisan politics in slowing confirmations of judicial nominees). 
196 See Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/19/us/deal-ends-impasse-over-judicial-nominees.html. 
197 See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges 
Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (2012) 
(studying the forces that tend to push federal judges to leave the bench). 
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federal judiciary?198 This is a particularly serious policy concern because 
increased workloads may already be reducing the rigor of judicial review,199 
and Republicans in the Senate continue to filibuster Obama nominees to 
the federal courts.200 
D. Supreme Court Review and Other Litigation 
The NLRB and the Obama Administration did not petition the D.C. 
Circuit to rehear the case en banc.201 Challengers to President Obama’s 
recess appointments were emboldened by Noel Canning, but by the time the 
case was decided, similar cases were already pending in a majority of the 
other circuits.202 In deciding those cases, two additional circuits embraced 
the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s Noel Canning opinion.203 In a similar 
case, a nursing home asked the Supreme Court to stay a district court order 
enforcing an NLRB injunction, or in the alternative, to grant certiorari and 
review the issue itself.204 The Court declined.205 Still, most commentators 
 
198 A diverse collection of legal organizations agrees that prolonged vacancies on federal 
courts pose a threat to effective and efficient justice. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Is Our Dysfunctional 
Process for Filling Judicial Vacancies an Insoluble Problem? (discussing the current judicial vacancy 
crisis and proposing possible solutions), in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: A PROGRES-
SIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE SECOND TERM (Am. Constitution Soc’y ed., 2013), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Wheeler_-_Filling_Judicial_Vacancies.pdf; Judicial Vacancies 
Slow the Wheels of Justice, PRWEB (July 12, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/ 
2010/07/prweb4248044.htm (expressing the ABA President’s displeasure at widespread judicial 
vacancies); see also Reid Alan Cox et al., Filibusters and the Constitution, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR 
L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD. (2007), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070325_ 
Filibusters.pdf (addressing the constitutional issues raised by the common practice of filibustering 
judicial nominations in the Senate). 
199 See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1127-37 (2011) (using an 
empirical analysis to argue that overburdened circuit courts necessarily treat appeals with 
diminished scrutiny). 
200 See Carl Hulse, Blocked Bids to Fill Judgeships Stir New Fight on Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. �, ����), http://www.nytimes.com/����/��/��/us/politics/filibuster-stirs-a-new-battle-on-us-
judges.html (discussing the continued filibuster of the President’s D.C. Circuit nominees). 
201 Charlie Savage, Recess Appointments Ruling to Be Appealed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/us/politics/obama-to-appeal-ruling-curbing-recess-appointments.html. 
202 See Lyle Denniston, Spreading Challenge to Appointment Power, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 28, 
2013, 4:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/spreading-challenge-to-appointment-power 
(noting that the constitutional controversy over the President’s recess appointments had spread to 
“all but three of the federal courts of appeals”). 
203 See NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 647 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he term ‘the Re-
cess’ means the intersession period of time between an adjournment sine die and the start of the Senate's 
next session.”); NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We hold that 
‘the Recess of the Senate’ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks.”).  
204 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. Kreisberg, 133 S. Ct. 
1002 (2013) (No. 12A769), 2013 WL 417696.  
205 See HealthBridge Mgmt., 133 S. Ct. at 1002 (denying application for stay and denying certiorari). 
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agreed that the Court would eventually have to settle the conflict between 
the circuits.206 Even respondent Noel Canning agreed that the Court should 
grant certiorari to settle “a constitutional question of extreme importance.”207  
On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision during October Term 2013.208 Petitioners, the NLRB 
and the Solicitor General, asked the Court to consider two questions: 
1. Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised 
during a recess that occurs within a session of the Senate, or is instead lim-
ited to recesses that occur between enumerated sessions of the Senate.  
2. Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised to 
fill vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies 
that first arose during that recess.209  
In granting certiorari, the Court added an additional question for delib-
eration. The Court asked the litigants to consider “[w]hether the President’s 
recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening 
every three days in pro forma sessions.”210 The Court’s decision to present a 
third question suggests it might consider following a narrower path toward 
invalidating President Obama’s recess appointments.  
Noel Canning has attracted significant coverage in the academic and pop-
ular press.211 Despite the breadth and depth of analysis, however, the outcome 
 
206  See, e.g., TODD GARVEY & DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43030, THE RECESS APPOINTMENT POWER AFTER NOEL CANNING V. NLRB: CONSTITU-
TIONAL IMPLICATIONS 13 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43030.pdf 
(“These differences [among various circuits’ interpretations] are substantial and may provide a 
strong justification for the Supreme Court to grant review of this case.” (footnote omitted)); Lyle 
Denniston, Broad Limit on Appointments Urged, SCOTUSBLOG (May 23, 2013, 5:21 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/broad-limit-on-appointments-urged (“There has been no 
doubt that the Justices would eventually take on the dispute, which would lead the Court into a 
fundamental inquiry about constitutional meaning.”). 
207 Brief of Respondent Noel Canning at 9, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013) 
(No. 12-1281), 2013 WL 2279703. 
208 Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. at 2861. 
209 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (No. 12-1281), 2013 
WL 1771081. 
210 Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. at 2862. 
211 See, e.g., Nicole Schwartzberg, What Is a "Recess"?: Recess Appointments and the Framers' 
Understanding of Advice and Consent, 28 J.L. & POL. 231 (2013) (providing a thorough analysis of 
the proper interpretation of “the Recess”); Peter Strauss, Reaction, The Pre-Session Recess, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 130, 130-31 (2013) (rejecting the formalism of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion given 
the practical realities of the Founding era); Cass R. Sunstein, Reaction, Originalism v. Burkeanism: 
A Dialogue over Recess, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 126 (2013) (analyzing the case through a hypothetical 
dialogue between the two interpretive philosophies); Adrian Vermeule, Reaction, Recess Appointments 
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of the case before the Supreme Court is unpredictable. A superficial view of 
the case suggests that the issue might be decided along purely partisan lines. 
Over the long run, however, it is not clear which party would benefit from a 
more expansive reading of the Recess Appointments Clause.212 There are a 
number of additional ideological divides at the core of Noel Canning. Should 
the Court view the issues through a purely originalist lens, or follow a 
Burkean approach based on the practices of the last two centuries?213 The 
case also asks the Justices to calibrate the balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches—an issue that divides the Court, but not 
necessarily along predictable partisan lines.214 Such crosscutting interests 
complicate efforts to predict the outcome of the case.  
Prognosticators face an additional challenge because the Supreme Court 
might resolve the case in a number of different ways. At the extremes, the 
Court could affirm the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in its entirety or reverse and 
espouse the reasoning of Evans v. Stephens. Embracing either of these 
options would do the most to settle the meaning of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause. Because the D.C. Circuit’s opinion rests on alternative 
grounds and because the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an additional 
question, the Court would have to rule in the NLRB’s favor on each of the 
three questions presented in order to reverse the D.C. Circuit.  
The Court has a number of more subtle options as well. It could follow 
Judge Griffith’s concurrence and reach only the first constitutional question, 
which would be sufficient to affirm the decision below.215 The Court could also 
 
and Precautionary Constitutionalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 122, 122-23 (2013) (arguing that the D.C. 
Circuit was overly concerned about the risks posed by a broad recess appointment authority); 
Gerard Magliocca, Symposium: Listen to the Senate’s Recess Bell, SCOTUSBLOG (July 16, 2013, 2:06 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/symposium-listen-to-the-senates-recess-bell (“The Justices 
should decide [the case] by deferring to the Senate’s interpretation of its rules and practices 
governing recesses.”). The SCOTUSblog symposium provides a great deal of insightful analysis 
in posts by Elizabeth Wydra and Professors James Flug, Edward Hartnett, Michael Herz, and 
Victor Williams, among others. See Symposium, National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-labor-relations-board-v-noel-canning/ 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2013).  
212 Presidents from both parties have used the power aggressively. See supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. Intelligent political actors should realize that they are “behind a sort of 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance” because of the reality that “[a] given interpretation may be good for 
your team at one point in history and bad at another.” Herz, supra note 19, at 443. 
213 See Sunstein, supra note 211 (providing a thorough exploration of this dichotomy through 
a hypothetical dialogue). 
214 For instance, Justices Scalia and Kagan disagree on many issues, but both worked in the 
White House and have argued for relatively tight presidential control over independent agencies. 
See Robert V. Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency 
Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2488-89 (2011). 
215 See supra Part II.D. 
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take a minimalist approach and skirt the core constitutional issues. It could 
defer to the Senate’s constitutional power to set its own rules,216 and find that 
the pro forma sessions were sufficient to block any recess appointments, 
without reaching the more sweeping conclusions of the D.C. Circuit.217  
Some commentators have urged the Court to determine that the issues are 
nonjusticiable political questions.218 After all, the Senate eventually confirmed 
President Obama’s nominee, Richard Cordray, as CFPB Director. Perhaps 
the Supreme Court acts most “wisely” when it steps back and permits the 
other branches’ “political and institutional incentives and disincentives to 
operate, as they were intended, to curb overreach by [an]other branch.”219  
The current quorum at the NLRB suggests yet another potential mini-
malist resolution. The subsequent nomination and confirmation of NLRB 
members did not render Noel Canning moot, because the NLRB loses 
jurisdiction to resolve a case once the record transfers to a federal court.220 
In an interesting twist, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan addressed this 
mootness question and reached the same conclusion in a letter written while 
the Supreme Court was considering the issue of whether the NLRB could 
act without a three-person quorum.221 Solicitor General Kagan argued that 
the case was not moot, but that it remained “unclear whether the Board 
has the authority to ‘ratify’ the two-member decisions en masse without 
reconsidering each case individually.” 222  Although the then-Solicitor 
General counseled against a blanket ratification, 223  some commentators 
believe the Supreme Court could remand Noel Canning to the NLRB, which 
could then take “official notice” of the original proceedings before the Board 
 
216 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”). 
217 See Magliocca, supra note 211 (providing a careful explanation of this argument). 
218 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, In NLRB Recess Appointments Case, Roberts Court Can Now Show 
It Knows How to Exercise Judicial Restraint, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES 1, 
3 (July 29, 2013), http://shanereactions.files.wordpress.com/����/��/peter-shane-argument-for-
judicial-restraint-in-recess-appointments-cases.pdf (encouraging the Court to find that the case 
presents “questions that the Court regards as constitutionally left to the elected branches of 
government to decide for themselves”). 
219 Id.  
220 See John Elwood, Could Senate Action After Cloture Reform Moot Noel Canning?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (July 12, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/12/could-senate-action-
after-cloture-reform-moot-noel-canning (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)). 
221 See Letter from Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen., to William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme 
Court (Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/SG-
letter-brief-NLRB-4-26-10.pdf (arguing New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board, 
130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010), had not been rendered moot by the subsequent appointment of two 
additional members to the NLRB). 
222 Id. at 2.  
223 See id. 
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and reaffirm the Board’s decision.224 This solution would allow the Court to 
completely avoid the thorny constitutional issues at play. Yet these mini-
malist approaches would leave the definition of the Recess Appointments 
Clause unclear and subject to further intercircuit conflict.  
Each of these paths leads to markedly different practical results for the 
President’s power to fill vacancies.  
CONCLUSION 
The Noel Canning decision is well reasoned and well researched. It presents 
a convincing argument for the original purpose of the Recess Appointments 
Clause in light of the Founders’ intent. But it also contradicts the decisions 
of three federal courts of appeals, a long history of executive practice, and at 
least some congressional acquiescence. Noel Canning is motivated by intense 
dedication to separation of powers, originalism, and the judiciary’s role as 
referee of constitutional boundaries. It conflicts with court decisions and 
commentators who value pragmatic, functional government.  
Both sides appeal to what they believe is the ultimate purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause. Supporters of Noel Canning’s reasoning point 
to the original purpose of the clause as a secondary backstop in a time when 
the Senate was in recess more than it was in the capital. Opponents point to 
the clause’s general purpose as a lubricant to facilitate the smooth function-
ing of government. Although the Noel Canning debate is often framed in 
partisan terms—three judges appointed by Republican presidents invalidat-
ing President Obama’s labor appointments225—it is worth remembering that 
in the span of a single decade, Democrats and Republicans have both 
objected to, and defended, the Recess Appointments Clause. 
The Supreme Court now faces the same choice between competing values. 
The Court’s decision will have significant consequences for the future of presiden-
tial power, governmental efficiency, and the Recess Appointments Clause itself.  
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